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Movements of Feeling and  
Moments of Judgement: Towards  
an Ontological Social Constructionism* 
John Shotter 
 
What is involved, in practice, coming to a judgement? The Norwegian 
family therapist, Tom Andersen, characterized himself as “a wanderer and 
worrier,” he was constantly reflecting on his ways of ‘going on’, on his 
own practice, to further develop and refine them. Each new way came to 
him, he said, on reaching a ‘crossroads’, a point when he felt unable to 
continue any longer in the same way. But once he stopped doing what he 
had come to see as ethically wrong, he found, he said, that the “alterna-
tives popped up almost by themselves” (Anderson/Jensen, 2007: 159). 
What I want to discuss is the fact that, while we can say that we can quite 
self-consciously and deliberately decide not to do something (perhaps 
never again) at a particular moment, in a new and particular situation we 
cannot be said to decide at any particular instant in time, positively what 
to do. New ways of acting cannot be planned; they have to emerge. As 
Lehrer (2009) suggests, coming to act in a way that seems to be for the 
best in a particular situation is not something we can decide upon simply 
within ourselves – judgmental work, in which we go out bodily, to relate 
ourselves imaginatively and feelingfully to various aspects of our current 
circumstances, aspect-by-aspect, sequentially, over time, seems to be re-
quired. It is what the nature of this imaginative judgmental work feels 
like, looks like, and sounds like that I want to discuss in this paper. 
Key words: feelings, judgement, orientation, resourcefulness,  
ontological social constructionism 
                                           
*  Based on a paper presented at Constructing Worlds conference, Taos Institute and 
MacMann Berg, 20th - 23rd August, Denmark, 2009. 
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“To get clear about philosophical problems, it is useful to become con-
scious of the apparently unimportant details of the particular situation in 
which we are inclined to make a certain metaphysical assertion. Thus we 
may be tempted to say ‘Only this is really seen’ when we stare at un-
changing surroundings, whereas we may not at all be tempted to say this 
when we look about us while walking” (Wittgenstein 1965: 66). 
 
“... what [these others] did was outside my skin. But whatever it was that I 
learned, my learning happened within my experiential sequence of what 
these important others... did” (Bateson 1979: 24). 
 
Here, I want to discuss a major rethinking of Social Constructionism, con-
cerned with how we can become a certain kind of person – with how to 
become a good listener, a good speaker, a good therapist or manager, etc., 
able to engage with one’s current circumstances in such a way as to be able 
to resolve on lines of action within them uniquely best suited to one’s imme-
diate needs. The approach might be called an ontological rather then an 
epistemological form of social constructionism, as central to it will be a 
concern with people developing different kinds of what I would like to call 
“ontological skills,” skills to do with being able to adopt this, that, or some 
other kind of active relation to one’s surroundings. Thus, instead of a focus 
on us as static thinkers, concerned to do our thinking within one or another 
orderly system of unchanging representations, I shall talk much more of us as 
being able to adopt this, that, or some other attitude, orientation, or way of 
relating ourselves to our surroundings while moving around within them, thus 
to be better able, in Wittgenstein’s (1953) terms, to know our ‘way around’, 
or to feel more ‘at home’ in them, with the consequence of better ‘knowing 
how to go on’ within them. 
As we shall see, adopting this approach will entail a focus on trying to 
grasp how much our bodies can ‘do for us’, so to speak, in the background to 
our more self-conscious, deliberately conducted activities, a focus on how 
much we learn all unawares as we intertwine our bodily movements in with 
particular features of our surroundings. It will also entail a focus much more 
on preparing than on planning activities, activities to do with how to adopt 
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an attitude or orientation rather than with possible sequences of action to 
take.  
Attention to such issues is not all that easy to sustain, for it entails trying 
to capture things ‘in motion’, which means trying to capture them while they 
are on the way to being other than they already are – in other words, we 
cannot easily name the things of our concern, for they have the character of, 
as William James (1890. 253) put it a long time ago, “signs of direction in 
thought”.1 They are ephemeral or transitional phenomena which have their 
being only in the unfolding dynamics, in the ‘time-contours’, of the feelings 
their arouse in us. However, although we cannot easily name them, we 
“nevertheless,” says James, can “have an acutely discriminative sense” 
(1890: 253) of their direction and ‘shape’. Indeed, as I have outlined else-
where (Shotter 2005a), they continually give rise both to the happening of 
“transitory understandings” and “action guiding anticipations.” And nowhere 
is this more prominently apparent to us than in the grammatical sensibilities 
at work in us as we make use of words, both in fashioning our utterances as 
speakers and in making sense of others utterances as listeners – and it is with 
how we can work with these sensings and senses that we have now have to 
consider. 
Once we ‘turn’ in this direction, once we adopt this approach – and move 
away from the static thinking subject towards the active, moving around 
agent – we realize that we can face two very different kinds of difficulties in 
our lives, not just one. While there are those difficulties we can formulate as 
problems and think of solving by the application of rational or methodical 
thought, we can also face another kind of problem altogether: what we might 
call difficulties of orientation, or difficulties of relating, to the unique, never 
before encountered, circumstances within which we find ourselves. Such 
difficulties often begin with our being bewildered or confused, with our, as 
                                           
1  As such signs of direction in thought James (1890: 253-254) went on to note: “Their 
function is to lead from one set of images to another... If we try to hold fast the feeling 
of direction, the full presence comes and the feeling of direction is lost... Now what I 
contend for, and accumulate examples to show, is that ‘tendencies’ are not only de-
scriptions from without, but that they are among the objects of the stream, which is 
thus aware of them from within, and must be described as in very large measure con-
stituted of feelings of tendency, often so vague that we are unable to name them at all.” 
 Movements of Feeling and Moments of Judgement 19 
  
 
Wittgenstein (1953) puts it, not knowing our “way about” (no. 123). These 
difficulties cannot be overcome simply by our thinking about them, for at 
first we have nothing to thinking with – the qualitatively unique nature, the 
character of situation we are ‘in’, is unclear to us. Only gradually, as we 
begin to move around within it, does its nature begin, so to speak, ‘to come 
into focus’ for us, so that we can gain a practical sense of “how to go on” (no. 
151) in the situation and resolve on its practical meaning for us, how we best 
should act within it.  
This new approach to Social Constructionism thus opens up a whole new 
realm of inquiry to us, one far less to do with our abilities as motionless 
thinkers, performing inner manipulations on inner mental representations (as 
in all the more cognitive approaches to psychology), and much more to do 
with our feeling our way forward in the moment, while moving around in the 
world. 
The image we need is, I think, something like this: It is as if we are living 
always within a thick fog, and must work like blind persons in terms of 
‘touchings’ or ‘sensings’, rather than in terms of ‘seeings’.2 However, what 
we have to gain a sense of through our sensings and touchings, is not of what 
actual objects are there before us, but of the possibilities these actualities 
                                           
2  Here’s the response of a friend, John Fenwick, to my saying it is like being in a fog: 
“Probably because I swim long distances at least four times each week and view my-
self as being a swimmer, the swimming analogy works better for me. In this regard, 
when learning to swim in a constantly moving stream, one has to constantly reorient 
and adjust constantly to once-only-occurring experiences, requiring constant reorienta-
tion of one’s body to these changes just to stay afloat, and then requiring agency and 
all that implies (in terms of visual perception and cognition) to move with intentionali-
ty and directionality. That is, swimming requires making constant judgements in now-
time and thinking doesn't help much, which is too slow. In terms of ‘stop doing’ so 
that one can reorient in the present, it would be like when one is drowning to stop 
thrashing about and to relax and float, if you get my drift so to speak. Buddhists refer 
to this as letting go or putting down the hot stone of suffering. Just put it down. Or it 
could be as when a child decides or is moved to stop playing with one toy and for 
some reason starts to engage in another play activity. Anyway, for me, the fog analogy 
in contrast implies that only the protagonist is in movement within a field of fixed ob-
jects or possibilities. Are these possibilities fixed or in constant motion and constantly 
changing?” Clearly, further exploration of the many different possible metaphoric im-
ages appropriate here is required. As we know, while each metaphor is revealing, it is 
also concealing. I am very grateful to John for this one. 
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present to us for our next possible steps, the anticipations aroused in us by 
our current circumstances. 
This capacity, to operate in terms of ephemeral, dynamic phenomena, 
which have their being only in the unfolding ‘time-contours’ of the feelings 
they arouse in us, is of course not a capacity possessed by any mechanical 
entities. It is, as we shall see, a capacity exhibited by beings only with an 
animate, living body – a topic that, with our focus in the past almost only on 
‘minds’, thought of almost only in terms of mechanical, information process-
ing imagery, is somewhat unfamiliar to us, even though our bodily being is in 
fact very familiar to us.  
Thus – if we are to orient ourselves effectively in our inquiries within it – 
this new, bodily oriented approach to Social Constructionism requires the 
development of a whole new range of theoretical, or better, descriptive 
concepts, if we are both to portray the rich and detailed nature of the results 
of our embodied ‘gropings’ within it, i.e., the possibilities for action they 
reveal to us, and to direct and organize our inquires within our surroundings 
further. 
Tom Andersen and the importance of ‘just happening’ events 
To put some flesh and blood into this account, to give it some living import, I 
would like for a while to discus the psychotherapeutic practices of Tom 
Andersen,3 who lived through many different ‘turnings’ in his approach as to 
how he might best conduct himself as a practitioner, concerned to help others 
conduct their lives in a more life-enhancing fashion. He characterized himself 
as a “wanderer and a worrier” (Andersen, n.d.), and talked of his “profes-
sional walk” as confronting him with a series of “road forks” or “crossroads,” 
that were to do, not with making a choice between, say, an A or a B, but to do 
with “having to give something up, really give it up” (Andersen 2007: 159). 
Clearly, Tom had his own ‘inner lodestone’ guiding his wanderings and 
his worryings, his own ‘inner compass’ that was ‘pointing’ toward a ‘some-
                                           
3  Tragically, Tom Andersen died on May 15, 2007 from the injuries he received when 
he fell on the rocky Norwegian coast. He was a close and dear friend and I miss him 
greatly. 
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thing’ that he never ceased trying to achieve. It gave him a feeling of dis-
quiet, a feeling of ‘not-yet-having-arrived’, of ‘not-being-there-yet’, “a 
restlessness in my body that won’t leave me alone,” he said (Andersen 2007: 
171), a feeling of restless that ‘called’ on him to act in some way – it is the 
nature of that felt tension, that feeling that seemed to guide him in all his 
therapeutic activities and in the innovations he made in his practices, that I 
want to try to highlight here. For it was not something that Tom thought, it is 
not a special theory or piece of information that could – if only the right 
words could be found – be set out as ‘his’ crucial perspective or framework. 
Indeed, as he himself said in The Reflecting Team in Action book (Friedman 
1995): “My way of telling about the origin and development of the reflecting 
process has shifted over the years. At first I often referred to theories, as if 
these processes were born our of intellectuality. Now I do not think so. I 
think rather they were consequences of feelings. Although I was unaware of 
it when the reflecting process first appeared in March 1985, I now think it 
was a solution to my feeling of discomfort as a therapist” (Andersen 1995: 
11). In other words, it was something that Tom first found ‘just happening’ in 
his own body, that was the basic source of the changes he made in his prac-
tice over the years. 
For instance, in the interview he did with Per Jensen just before he died, 
he commented that in the early days, even before the move out of “the closed 
room,” he and his colleagues were already changing their practices due to 
their feelings of discomfort certain ways of proceeding aroused. When they 
tried to apply the Milan approach and say to people: ‘we think you should 
think like this’, they felt the unpleasantness of it. For, in effect, they were 
saying: ‘You should stop thinking like you do, and start thinking like us’. It 
was about telling other people how they should live their lives, Tom said, and 
they could not continue doing it. Indeed, as he went on to comment, “It came 
as a great relief. And it was a big transition – from ‘either-or’ to ‘this and 
this’ (Andersen 2007: 159). For what might seem to be a small transition in 
practice, in fact turned out to be a ‘door’ that, so to speak, opened up a whole 
new world. For, as he put it: 
“Without realizing it then, I would now say that ‘either-or’ belongs in a 
world one can describe as immovable and to what we call also call ‘the 
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non-living’. So that is to say we worked with living people as though they 
belonged to ‘the non-living’. It felt uncomfortable, and it was a relief to 
move over to the ‘this and’ perspective [i.e, into ways of relating]” (An-
dersen 2007: 159). 
For it was the beginning of a move into a world of living beings and living 
movement. 
Gradually, over the years, Andersen continued to reflect on his own prac-
tice, on his way of ‘going on’, to further develop and refine it... and then 
continued to worry yet further about the right words in which to express what 
seemed to be his new way.  
Each new way came from him reaching a ‘crossroads’, from him not be-
ing able to continue any longer in the same way, from stopping something he 
came to see as ethically wrong... and then finding that, as he turned away 
from it, “alternatives popped up almost by themselves” (Andersen 2007: 
159). About these “road forks,” he noted in a recent account: “It has been 
very interesting to try to clarify what made me go down one road and not the 
other. If those are to be called ‘choices’, the choices have been very emo-
tional. I’m speaking as an Academic. There have been very few rational 
choices. It has also been interesting to notice that most of the choices have 
been to leave out something and say, ‘I cannot continue on that road any-
more’. I had to get out of it; it felt too uncomfortable to continue. That is 
interesting; not the choice of the road to follow, but to leave out things” 
(Andersen, in press).    
What I think is interesting here, and what in particular I want to empha-
size, is the minimal role of rational choice, of self-consciously conducted 
deliberations in this process. Indeed, as I see it, what is of crucial importance 
to us are the feelings that just happen within us as we at first ‘grope around’ 
in the somewhat ‘foggy’ surroundings within which we must find our ‘bear-
ings’. 
A landscape of possibilities, not actualities 
In the past, beginning with the notion of “joint action,” and moving on 
through Bakhtin’s (1981, 1984, 1986) talk of the “dialogical,” and on to 
Merleau-Ponty’s (1968) account of chiasmicly-structured events, I have been 
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very much concerned with events happening between people. But here today, 
I want – in a way that might seem for a social constructionist, some might 
say, a little ‘off colour’ – to talk of events that can happen within us as indi-
viduals, events that, as Gadamer (1989: xxviii) says, happen “to us over and 
above our wanting and doing”. For, as I see it, we cannot choose how to act 
in the new and unique situations we encounter in our practical lives, we 
cannot plan an appropriate line of action. We can, however, engage in self 
directed explorations of the new circumstances (both actual and imaginative, 
as we shall see), and it is in these explorations, I claim, that appropriate 
possible ways of acting can emerge. 
However... while we can decide very precisely what not to do, as Tom 
Andersen came to realize, resolving on a new line of action, gathering to-
gether all the relevant features of the now new situation one faces, takes 
judgement – for, to repeat, we have to consider, not facts, but possibilities. 
And a moment of judgement – the 3 to 5 second ‘present’ moment of a judg-
ment (Stern 2004) – entails, I want to suggest, some judgemental work, work 
in which we go out, imaginatively and feelingfully, to relate ourselves to 
various aspects of our current circumstances, aspect-by-aspect, sequentially, 
over time, with the aim of gathering them all together (resolving them) into 
what we might call an inner landscape of possibilities. Only once we have 
done this, only when we know our “way about” within such a landscape can 
we feel some confidence in “going on” (Wittgenstein 1953). 
It is what the nature of that imaginative judgmental work feels like, looks 
like, and sounds like that I want to discuss below. And I am going to take 
Tom’s comments above on the emergence of his own practice as central, for, 
as I shall claim, they capture very precisely what emergent developments in a 
practice situated within the sphere of human relations are, in practice, actu-
ally like. For, coming to act in a way that seems to be for the best in a par-
ticular situation is not something we can decide upon simply within our-
selves, we must turn towards the now new situation to which we have chosen 
to relate ourselves, and open ourselves to being spontaneously responsive to 
it – if we can do that, we will then find that various crucial happenings 
simply will occur quite spontaneously in the complex processes at work in 
the “popping up” of alternatives. 
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The ‘livingness’ of our living activities – what makes our sense of 
possibilities possible 
However, before we can come to a grasp of what it is that allows these hap-
penings to occur, that makes them possible, I must make a number of pre-
liminary comments to do with the nature of living activities in contrast to 
dead, mechanical ones. For, as I see it, it is the whole attitude of mind we 
have inherited from Descartes that stands in the way of our paying attention 
to crucial features of the ‘livingness’ of our living activities.  
Firstly, we must note that all our living activities are developmental, they 
are both identity preserving and irreversible in time; they thus have a style to 
them such that the others around us (and we ourselves for that matter) can 
anticipate, if not our actual next step, at least our possible next steps. In other 
words, they can be said to have a grammar to them. Indeed, as Bakhtin 
(1981) puts it: “The word in living conversation is directly, blatantly, oriented 
toward a future answer-word; it provokes an answer, anticipates it and struc-
tures itself in the answer’s direction. Forming itself in an atmosphere of the 
already spoken, the word is at the same time determined by that which has 
not yet been said but which is needed and in fact anticipated by the answer-
ing word. Such is the situation of any living dialogue” (Bakhtin 1981: 280, 
my emphasis). No machines operating in terms simply of cause-and-effect 
processes can arouse anticipations of next possible steps in each other in this 
way – this is of crucial importance. 
Secondly, in such a spontaneously responsive sphere of activity as this, 
instead of one person first acting individually and independently of an other, 
and then the second replying also individually and independently of the first, 
we act jointly, as a collective-we. For we respond to each other’s utterances 
bodily, in a ‘living’ way without our having first ‘to work out’ how to re-
spond to each other. This means that when someone acts, their activity cannot 
be accounted as wholly their own activity – for in being spontaneously 
responsive to each other, everyone’s acts are partly ‘shaped’ by those of the 
others around them. This is where all the (largely still uncharted) strangeness 
of the dialogical begins (“joint action” – Shotter 1980, 1984, 1993a and b). 
Of especial importance here, is not only the fact that such actions are neither 
yours nor mine, but truly ‘ours’, but also that fact that a ‘something’, a unique 
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‘it’ with its own qualitative character is created amongst all involved in the 
interaction.  
Samuel Todes (2001) suggests a third important characteristic of our liv-
ing, human, bodily activities: He suggests that we are often disoriented, 
bewildered, or lost in the world, in the sense that, like Tom Andersen, we 
find ourselves experiencing a restlessness, a sense of lack in ourselves – an 
indeterminate lack of something-or-other – without at first any sense of what 
will remove that lack. As he puts it: “We came into the world ‘lost’. It was 
not that we had lost something, but that we were lost. If we had lost some-
thing, it would have been something we previously possessed.... [Thus] our 
whole quest of discovery is thus initially prompted by need rather than desire. 
It is initially ‘directed’ not to get what we want but to discover what we want 
to get” (Todes 2001: 177) – we retrospectively ‘discover’ our needs to our-
selves by finding in our explorations what will satisfy them. Todes (2001) 
thus suggests that, irrespective of what we might cognitively desire in our 
actions, our bodies are primary oriented towards becoming well oriented in 
our surroundings, towards achieving what he calls poise.  
Just as our two eyes automatically achieve a common point of fixation 
and a clear focus, thus to give us a visual sense of depth, i.e., a bodily sense 
of what is near to and what is far from us, so also with the rest of our bodily 
senses. Their intentionality is aimed at our achieving poise, a being ‘at home-
ness’ in our current surroundings. Indeed, as he sees it, being poised is “being 
in touch with one’s circumstances” (Todes 2001: 66), being ready to respond 
immediately and spontaneously in what ever way is required by the exigen-
cies of our circumstances. “To lose touch is immediately to lose one’s poise” 
(Todes 2001: 66). In other words, the basic intentionality of our bodies is 
directed towards giving us the global sense of ‘where’ currently we are and 
where we might go next, presupposed in all our higher forms of self-directed 
activity. We are continually trying to learn how best to orient ourselves in our 
surroundings so as to be knowingly in touch with the others and othernesses 
around us. It is a basic need – a need quite different from Maslow’s (1943) 
need for “self-actualization.” 
Thus the success of our becoming oriented is not to be found in our actu-
ally executing a precisely namable sequence of activities, but in something 
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prior to it. As Todes (2001: 65-66) says, “as soon as I am poised in my 
circumstance, I know what I am doing. I know not merely what movements I 
am making. I know at once, by doing it... what I am doing.” Along with 
knowing how, bodily, we are walking on two rather than four feet; how we 
know that we walking forwards rather than sideways; that our bodies are 
upright rather than horizontal; that the car you are in is turning rather then 
going in a straight line; that are moving uphill rather than downhill; and so on 
and so on; these are ‘sensings’ continually present to us that work in the 
background to orient us in our more deliberate actions, a part of our compo-
sure, poise (balance), or assuredness in the world. In other words, in our 
coming to feel ‘at home’ within our surroundings, we come to be knowingly 
aware of the possibilities available to us in acting in relation to the others and 
othernesses in them. As we shall see, this work prior to our acting, to do with 
our becoming more well-oriented in our surroundings, is of a quite different 
kind to that involved in problem-solving. 
Difficulties of the intellect and difficulties of the will 
This urge to overcome a restlessness, a feeling of lack within onself, a spe-
cific tension, a sense of not yet being ‘at home’ in one’s surroundings, was 
clearly central to the account Tom Andersen gave of the “road forks” he 
encountered in his “professional walk,” for clearly, each fork involved, not 
the choice of the road to follow, but of things to leave out – only to find that 
as he turned toward a new context, away from a reliance on what he felt 
uncomfortable with, to repeat, that “alternatives popped up almost by them-
selves” (Anderson/Jensen 2007: 159), and it is this that I want to explore. 
In exploring it – the choice to stop doing something along with the spon-
taneous emergence, i.e., the non-choice, of a better alternative to it – I want to 
distinguish between two kinds of difficulties we can face in our practical 
affairs: What Wittgenstein (1980: 17) called difficulties of the intellect, and 
difficulties of the will – and I want to stick with talk of difficulties instead of 
talking of problems, for as we shall see, talk of problems is much more to do 
with arriving at answers to clear questions, while talk of difficulties is more 
to do with overcoming confusions and disorientations in practical life.   
 Movements of Feeling and Moments of Judgement 27 
  
 
We can formulate difficulties of the intellect, then, as problems which, 
with the aid of clever theories or appropriate frameworks of thought, we can 
solve by the use of reasoning, by rational methods. Difficulties of the will, 
however, are quite different. For they are to do with how we need to find a 
way of relating ourselves (bodily, i.e., sensitively and emotionally) to the 
others and othernesses around us, how we orient ourselves or take up an 
attitude or stance towards them, the ways in which we see them, hear them, 
experience them, value them – for it is these ways that determine what possi-
bilities for action we can perceive in the situation we are in, they determine 
or ‘give shape’ to the lines of action we finally resolve on carrying out. And 
unlike the static contemplative thinker, we must do all this from within our 
engaged activity with the others and othernesses we encounter within the 
situation of our action, either actual or imagined. 
To grasp a bit more clearly what is involved here, let me examine the se-
quence of steps involved in both these processes.  
(1) First, problem-solving: Approaching a newness or strangeness as a 
problem to be solved requires us to first analyze it into a set of identifiable 
elements; we must then find a pattern or order amongst them; and then 
hypothesize a hidden agency responsible for the order (call it, the working of 
certain rules, principles, or laws, or the working of a story or narrative). We 
then seek further evidence for its influence, thus to enshrine it in a theory or 
theoretical system. We go on to make use of such theories in giving shape to 
our actions. In other words, we manipulate the strangeness (now known in 
terms of the theory) to produce an advantageous outcome which we call ‘the 
solution’ to our problem, and we then turn ‘to apply’ the theory elsewhere. 
As investigators, we ourselves remain unchanged in the process; we re-
main outside and separate from the other or otherness we are investigating; 
rather than being engaged or involved in with it we are ‘set over against’ it; in 
acquiring extra knowledge about it – in the form of facts or information – we 
gain mastery over it. 
(2) Alternatively, in resolving on a line of action: Instead of immediately 
trying to analyze it into its elements, we can treat the other or otherness as a 
being that is still radically unknown to us, and, by ‘opening’ ourselves to 
being spontaneously ‘moved’ by it, we can ‘enter into’ a living, dialogically-
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structured relationship with it – In other words, we can become involved or 
engaged in an active, back and forth relationship, with it, a relationship in 
which, if we go slowly, and allow time for the imaginative work that each 
response can occasion to take place, we can gain a sense of the ‘inner land-
scape’, the ‘invisible landscape of possibilities’ confronting us to become 
“visibly-rational” (Garfinkel 1967: vii) to us.  
To try to exhibit what I mean here, I would like to set out the following 
rather general scenario, while likening it to a number of other more specific, 
similar situations. To repeat, it is necessary to go slowly through this se-
quence and to take the time required to go through the imaginative work 
necessary to develop a sense of what it feels like, looks like, and sounds like, 
to be in the situation at each stage in its gradual articulation: We enter a new 
situation (pause – imagine a particular situation); at first, we are confused, 
bewildered, we don’t know our way about (pause – how does it feel?); but as 
we ‘dwell in’ it, as we begin to ‘move around’ within it, we begin to respond 
to aspects of it, we begin to notice specific details (imagine the aspects, 
imagine the details); as we range over them we begin to get a more ordered 
sense of a ‘something’, of it as having a qualitatively distinct character4 to it – 
but how might we come to a grasp of its nature. It is at this point that we 
often find an image comes to us, we find that we can express this ‘something’ 
in terms of an image; but what image? In trying to characterize his inchoate 
but still partially structured sense of what we ‘know’5 in relation to our use of 
language, Wittgenstein (1953) uses a city, a toolbox, the controls in the 
driving cab of a train, and many different types of games, all as metaphors for 
different aspects of our experiences of the use of language (take time to go 
                                           
4  Its character can emerge for us in the ‘time contours’ or ‘time shapes’ that become 
apparent in the dynamic relations we can sense between our different outgoing (expec-
tant) activities and the incoming results consequent upon them. 
5  While I use the word ‘know’ here, in On Certainty, Wittgenstein (1969) pointed out 
that what we rely on within an interaction, although fixed and stable within it – and 
can be likened to the hinge a door pivots on – it is not fixed and stable for all time out-
side of the momentary swinging of the door. Thus instead of saying that we ‘know’ 
these things, he suggests that we could say: “‘It stands fast for me that...’? And further: 
‘It stands fast for me and many others...’” (no. 116) in the moment of interaction only, 
not for all time. 
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through at least some of the uses of language that can ‘motivate’ the bringing 
of such images to mind). In other words, we need to accept that no one single 
image will capture all the complex aspects of a complex circumstance; for 
beyond every image we find, we can find another, and another. And after 
having gone through a number of images, we can finally arrive at a sense of 
the landscape of possibilities giving rise to them all. Indeed, once we have 
gained a sense of familiarity with such a landscape, once we can come to feel 
confident of knowing our way about within it6, we can then resolve on a way 
of going on within it with some confidence that, at the time, it was the best 
possible way. 
Clearly, this means that the process of resolving on a line of action cannot 
be a simple matter of calculation, or of decision making as a choice among a 
set of already clear alternatives; it involves judgement, a moving around on 
the landscape of possibilities while being spontaneously responsive to the 
consequences of each move, and judging which one (or combination of 
moves) best resolves the initial tension aroused in one’s initial confusion – 
for, to repeat, we are operating here, not in the realm of actualities but of 
possibilities. As Senge et al. (2006: 89) comment: “Standard theories of 
change revolve around making decisions, determining ‘the vision’,” whereas, 
they suggest, it is much more to do with, “reaching a state of clarity about 
and connection to what is emerging, [coming] to an ‘inner knowing’ where, 
‘in a sense, there is no decision making. What to do just becomes obvious’, 
and what is achieved ‘depends on where you’re coming from and who you 
are as a person.’” 
As investigators, then, we ourselves are changed in such encounters. For, 
in becoming involved with, immersed in, the ‘inner life’ of the others or 
othernesses around us, everything we do can be partly shaped by being in 
response to what they might do. Thus, rather than an objective knowledge of 
their nature, we gain an orientation toward them, we grasp how to ‘go on’ 
with them in terms of the possible ways they might respond to us. Although 
                                           
6  As metaphors for the general bewilderment we can feel in new circumstances, we 
might take what it feels like to have to find one’s way about in a new building (a hos-
pital, a business headquarters), in a city, in a fog, being ‘all at sea’, and so on. 
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at first we can be wholly ‘bewitched’ (Wittgenstein 1953: no. 109) by their 
‘voice’, as our familiarity with them grows, their voice can become just one 
voice among the many other voices within us, and we can become ‘disen-
chanted’ with what they ‘call’ us upon us to do. However, we can never gain 
complete mastery over them – they can always surprise us, no matter how 
familiar to us they have become. Our constant vigilance is required; the 
precise words we use are important – for their grammar commits us now to 
what is expected of us in the future.  
What can be called thinking here? 
Now my purpose in asking readers to undertake the slow, step-by-step reading 
of the sentences above – in which I set out a rather general scenario, while 
likening it to a number of other more specific, similar situations – was, of 
course, to allow the possibility of richer, more extensive responsive movements 
to occur within you as readers, as well as allow time for the ‘shape’ of such 
movements to resonate within you, thus to “remind” you of something that is 
already familiar to you (Wittgenstein 1953, no. 89)7 – to ‘call up’ one or two or 
more previous experienced concrete episodes whose ‘time-contours’ are similar 
to those traced out in the unfolding dynamics of those statements as you inter-
nally utter them. In other words, in more general terms, as we dwell in and 
move around in each new situation we face, a gradual growth of familiarity 
with their ‘inner shape’ can occur; we can then begin to gain a sense of the 
value of their yet-to-be-achieved aspects – the prospects they offer us for ‘going 
on’ within them. Thus, as we gain orientation, a sense of being ‘at home’ 
within them, we can come to find our ‘footing’, our placement or who we can 
be within them. And this, as was clear from your responses to my utterances 
above, can be done imaginatively. We can make sense of our current circum-
stances in relation to certain of our past experiences. So what might what we 
could thinking be like in such situations as these? 
                                           
7  Wittgenstein (1953: no. 89): “Something that we know when no one asks us, but no 
longer know when we are supposed to give an account of it, is something that we need 
to remind ourselves of. (And it is obviously something of which for some reason it is 
difficult to remind oneself.)” 
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Here we can begin again with where we began with Tom Andersen, with 
the nature of a felt tension, an uncomfortableness, a dis-satisfaction, with a 
restlessness that won’t go away – but not with any old dis-satisfaction, but a 
dis-satisfaction of a qualitatively distinct kind. This time, however, Wittgen-
stein (1953) will be the subject of my inquiry. Disquiets were aroused in him 
by such questions as: “What is meaning?” “What is understanding?” “What is 
a proposition?” “What is a word really?” by such questions that, I sure, have 
occupied some of you in this conference, like: “What is a dialogue, or a 
narrative, really?” He sensed that there were no final definitive answers to 
such questions as these, that they could never be settled by the formulating of 
a final, single, correct theory. Indeed, in relation to them he remarked: “The 
problems [I would now say – difficulties, js] arising through a misinterpreta-
tion of our forms of language have the character of depth. They are deep 
disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us as the forms of our language and 
their significance is as great as the importance of our language. – Let us ask 
ourselves: why do we feel a grammatical joke to be deep? (And that is what 
the depth of philosophy is.)” (Wittgenstein 1953: no. 111). So, how might we 
begin to approach such deep difficulties as these? 
Well, after having suggested that the meaning of a word is to be found in 
how it is used – in this, that, or some other circumstance in influencing the 
practicalities of our everyday life activities – and, in order not to provoke us 
once again into theorizing,8 he turns to arousing occasions within us when 
various memorable events have actually happened to us. He thus asks us: 
                                           
8  Wittgenstein (1953:no. 109): “It was true to say that our considerations could not be 
scientific ones. It was not of any possible interest to us to find out empirically ‘that, 
contrary to our preconceived ideas, it is possible to think such- and-such’ - whatever 
that may mean. (The conception of thought as a gaseous medium.) And we may not 
advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considera-
tions. We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place. 
And this description gets its light, that is to say its purpose, from the philosophical 
problems. These are, of course, not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by 
looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us rec-
ognize those workings: in despite of an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are 
solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known. 
Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of lan-
guage.” 
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“What happens when...?” “What does it mean to say...?” or to ask us to: 
“Consider... X...?” or to: “Imagine... Y...?” or to question us further in such a 
way as ask us to think again: “But is it as we unthinkingly tend to say it...?” 
And in asking such questions as these, in line with his concern with how our 
responsive relations to the particularities of our surroundings (in discussing 
what might be involved in teaching a new language-game involving named 
elements9), he asserts that: “In order to see more clearly, here as in countless 
similar cases, we must focus on the details of what goes on; must look at 
them from close to” (Wittgenstein 1953: no. 51) – the concrete details of the 
situation matter greatly (see epigraph quotation)! 
Of course, when we do focus on the details, we begin to realize how com-
plicated (and overwhelming) is the task of (fully) describing what happens 
when... x..., when, say (to use Wittgenstein’s 1953: no.169, example), we 
look along a line of print in a text, and compare it with looking along a line of 
arbitrary symbols: “&8§ §? 8!’§*” whilst saying a sentence as we do the 
looking. After having asked us to make this comparison and to describe the 
two different experiences to ourselves, he then goes on to ask us: “Can’t one 
feel that in the first case the utterance was connected with seeing the signs 
and in the second went on side by side with the seeing without any connec-
tion?” (Wittgenstein 1953: no. 169, my emphases). And we, of course, can 
and we answer: ‘Yes, there was a difference’. But how we might best de-
scribe what it is that enables us to read the ink-marks of text as having mean-
ings, while seeing the sequence of arbitrary symbols as meaningless, leads us 
into yet further complications. 
I won’t follow up these complications any further here. But what I do 
want to do, is to draw out of this example the importance of distinguishing 
between two kinds of talk: That kind of talk which is shaped merely by our 
                                           
9  “For naming and describing do not stand on the same level: naming is a preparation 
for description. Naming is so far not a move in the language-game-any more than 
putting a piece in its place on the board is a move in chess. We may say: nothing has 
so far been done, when a thing has been named. It has not even got a name except in 
the language-game. This was what Frege meant too, when he said that a word had 
meaning only as part of a sentence” (Wittgenstein 1953: no. 49). 
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sense of the grammar of the words we are using,10 a grammar that is in fact 
drawn from an intellectual framework previously learned in a classroom – so 
that, for instance, once we have asked, say, about the information processing 
at work in a person’s brain we feel that we must then ask about its causes – 
and that kind of talk which is shaped by the ‘shape’ of a particular experience 
of ours. For the issue here is to do with our right to speak as we do, with 
whether we can justify our talk by being able to describe to others the criteria 
we used, or are using, in judging how we ‘went on’, or are ‘going on’, in the 
particular situation in question.11 
We are moving into waters too deep to consider this issue much further in 
such a short talk as this. But the issue to do with our ‘right use’ of words, is 
of crucial importance to Social Constructionists – especially those tempted to 
follow, say, Rorty’s (1989: 44) claim that intellectual progress proceeds by 
“the literalization of selected metaphors.” For then, as he sees it, our task is 
very “largely a matter of redescribing other things [not captured by current 
metaphors], trying to outflank the objections by enlarging the scope of one's 
favorite metaphors.” So, rather than like Wittgenstein, who is concerned to 
re-connect our particular use of words to details within the actual surround-
ings of their use, Rorty’s strategy is “to try to make the vocabulary in which... 
                                           
10  A grammar is perspectival, i.e., it suggests an ordering of events in a particular 
situation. It is thus easy, given a particular word – like ‘mechanism’, say – to think 
that one must seek a causal structure at work in a situation. But once we turn to the 
grammar of a situation, an actual language intertwined situation, a landscape of possi-
bilities that we have arrived at as the result of a judgement, things are different. For we 
find that the structure of a judgement (an achievement – Ryle 1949) is a structure of 
acts of judgement (a structure of successfully executed tasks – Ryle 1949), in which 
the things sequentially achieved in the overall judgement cannot be individuated inde-
pendently of the person judging them, for it is the particular judge’s end in view – the 
initial tension that was there at the beginning of the whole inquiry – that selects the 
criteria relevant to the dimensions of judgement applied by the (practitioner) judge. 
11  The classic argument here, over the right use of words, is well stated by Lewis Carroll 
in Alice through the Looking-Glass, in an episode where Humpty-Dumpty uses the 
word ‘glory’ in a way that confuses Alice: “‘But “glory” doesn't mean “a nice knock-
down argument”,’ Alice objected. ‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said, in ra-
ther a scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less.’ 
‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so many different 
things.’ ‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master – that’s all.’ 
(From http://www.sabian.org/Alice/lgchap06.htm). 
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objections [of opponents] are phrased look bad, thereby changing the subject, 
rather than granting the objector his choice of weapons and terrain by meet-
ing his criticisms head on” (Rorty 1989: 44). 
This, of course, is still to leave the issue of people’s actual, practical con-
cern, formulated in academic vocabularies, to be fought over by academics. 
Rather than continuing this argument here, however, let me turn very briefly 
to what might seem to be involved in training people in coming to make the 
judgements appropriate to being a certain kind of practitioner. 
Conclusions: training to be a judge – on coming to know truly ‘how 
to go on’ within a practice 
1. What is entailed in training to be a judge? Too often, when thinking of 
ourselves as practitioners, we still tend to think of ourselves primarily as 
thinkers, as inhabiting, not this our that actual practical situation, but as 
inhabiting this or that particular system of mental representations, which we 
describe in terms of ‘models’, ‘theories’, or ‘theoretical frameworks’. We are 
thus anxious to learn each new theory or model as it comes ‘on the scene’, if 
we are to feel ‘up to the minute’ in our practices. The view I am describing 
here, however – Wittgenstein’s view, and, I think, Tom Andersen’s view also 
– is the opposite of this.  
As I see it, following Wittgenstein, our role as practitioners, continually 
occupying new and unique situations for yet “another first time” (Garfinkel 
1967: 9), is essentially that of a judge who must gather together, in both 
actual and imaginative explorations of each new situation, the distinctive 
details relevant to each such situation in an effort to resolve on a best way of 
‘going on’ within them. In doing this, our initial task involves our actively 
dwelling in, or amongst, whatever is ‘out there’ in each situation in order, 
first, to find an attitude, a stance, or a way of relating to, what seems to be 
‘there’ around us, and then to discover what we can want within it, while 
finally, trying to organize our engagements with the ‘things-we-can-now-see-
within-it’ to get what we want. All this, as Todes (2001) and Luntley (2003) 
claim, is a part of what it is to be an agent with a will.  
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But it is not only the initial adoption of an appropriate attitude that is (or 
can be) wilful – for example, the adopting of an attitude of “speaking in order 
to listen,” as distinct from “listening in order to speak,” as described by Lynn 
Hoffman (2002: 181), or, as Harlene Andersen (1997) describes it, as adopt-
ing a “philosophical stance – a way of being in relationship with of fellow 
human beings, including how we think about, talk with, act with, and respond 
to them” (Andersen 1997: 94) – but also, as the way of relating entailed 
unfolds, we need, self-consciously, to manage the explorations we embark 
upon within it. The meaning of what is ‘there in reality’ around us, i.e., the 
possibilities for our next steps, thus only become apparent to us in the dy-
namic happenings (to repeat my remarks above) that occur in the relations 
between our outgoing actions and the consequent ‘movements’ and ‘touch-
ings’ aroused in us as a result.  
Above, then, as we imaginatively outline to ourselves – provoked by 
Wittgenstein’s (1953) whole style of inquiry, that moves us away from 
theorizing to the bringing to mind the concrete details of actually remem-
bered experiences – how particular events, expressions, etc., have ‘touched’ 
or ‘moved’ us, we can live out in our exchanges with each other what experi-
encing, perceiving (i.e. looking, listening, feeling, etc.), thinking, valuing, and 
talking (i.e., expressing oneself) “from within” the complexity of an ongoing 
situation, feel like, and look like. 
Elsewhere, I have likened the discipline involved in this to Goethe’s 
(Shotter 2005b) exact sensorial imagination. But such a discipline cannot, as 
is now obvious, be taught simply being told of theories, models, protocols, 
recipes, of frameworks in solely in a classroom. One needs to be involved in 
something like the serving of an apprenticeship. 
Maxine Sheets-Johnstone (2000) provides an account of apprenticeships 
that demonstrates how learning can only take place if, while watching an act 
being performed, an already a proto-performing goes along with what is 
being watched. She then further argues that this must also be the case for 
verbal instructions, that they can only be instructive if the meaning of the 
words used are intertwined in with a rehearsal of the enactment they are 
aimed at describing. What matters to practitioners learning is a skill a founda-
tional ability for joint attention and the intercorporeal awareness that goes 
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along with it, i.e., the awareness that the movements of others are consequent 
upon their movements. Sheets-Johnstone (2000) is thus critical of Dreyfus’ 
(1998a, 1998b) notion of apprenticeship, in which ‘rules’ are at first enunci-
ated, for its ignoring of the degree to which al whole multitude of nonlinguis-
tic kinetic corporeal concepts are ignored: concepts such as fast, slow, turn-
ing, stopping, close, far, etc.; as well as fundamental spatio-temporal learn-
ings to do with, for example, one’s directional movement possibilities, as in 
moving forward, sideward, or diagonally, as well as with having avenues of 
avoidance or escape or in having none, i.e., being cornered and unable to 
move; and on temporal learnings having to do with, for example, sequences 
of movement and if/then relationships – as in finding particular progressions 
of movements to be possible or impossible, and to be good or bad, e.g., 
particular progressions have particular progressive effects, particular moves 
constrain or enable future moves, and so on. Thus, as she sees it, in omitting 
these developmental, nonlinguistic kinetic corporeal understandings from his 
account, Dreyfus casts “an adultist net over the whole terrain” (Sheets-
Johnstone 2000: 355), and fails to account for what it is that makes it possi-
ble for us as adults to serve as apprentices to others more skillful profession-
als later in life.  
2. Training in using language ‘by right’: Training in using language by 
right thus entails training a practitioner to be a judge. This only emerges in 
practical activities of a mattering kind, in which talk and such activities are 
intertwined; the simple statement of rules leaves the learner bewildered. 
Training to be a judge includes, centrally, coming to see similarities (Witt-
genstein 1953: no. 69) and coming to speak with a right as someone able to 
speak responsibly, i.e., as someone ‘in touch’ with the circumstances of their 
talk (no. 289), thus to be able to articulate a justification of one’s actions in 
relation to the particularities of the situation (no. 154). It is, in other words 
(LW’s words), a matter of one being able to see things aright. 
There are consequences of our adopting an attitude, says Wittgenstein 
(1953: 228), “but of a diffuse kind. Experience ... can inform us of them, and 
they too are incapable of general formulation; only in scattered cases can one 
arrive at a correct and fruitful judgement, establish a connection.”  
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The involvement of will means that it is a case of judgement all the way 
down. This has all been about the conditions for the possibility of judgement. 
The recipe for that is the will in direct engagement with that which is inde-
pendent of will, and the latter can include the attitude of another will. 
3. The ‘just happening’ nature of the gaining of embodied experiences: 
What might we be doing in our dialogical-reflective activities – as we each 
present to the others in a group aspects of how an event, an expression, has 
‘touched’ or ‘moved’ us? We are living out in our exchanges with each other 
what experiencing, perceiving (i.e. looking, listening, feeling, etc.), thinking, 
valuing, and talking (i.e., expressing oneself) “from within” the complexity of 
an ongoing situation, feels like and looks like. 
Further, in facing up to, and in being prepared to ‘stumble around in 
words’ in an effort to articulate these ‘feels’, we can devise between us 
‘ways’ of turning present (and past) passing moments into moments that we 
can ‘re-call’, over and over again, thus to subject them to even more detailed 
examinations. Or to put it another way, we are ‘unpacking’ the enormous 
complexity of a passing circumstance that usually “all goes by so quick” 
(Wittgenstein 1953: no. 435) in such a way as to render it rationally visible, 
i.e., to linguistically portrayal, in such a way as to make it into something that 
can be discussed and explored amongst us in all its complex detail. 
As a consequence, we can come to embody this kind of coming-to-know 
within our lives without effort, automatically, as we did early on as an aspect 
of our ‘growing up into’ the world and the culture of the those around us. It is 
done ‘in’ our being spontaneously responsive to ‘things’ occurring around us 
(including the spontaneous expressions of those around us), and also, by them 
being spontaneously responsive to the expressive aspects of our responsive-
ness. Indeed, the consequences of our spontaneous involvement in this cease-
less flow of living, expressive-responsiveness accumulates in our bodies like 
the effects of good and bad summers and winters are observably ‘there’ in the 
rings in the trunks of trees (this may not be the best analogy, but it’s the only 
one I can think of at the moment). As Bateson (1979: 24) remarks, “the shape 
of what happened between you and me yesterday carries over to the shape of 
how we respond to each other today.” It is a form of spontaneous learning 
without any explicit teaching that gives rise to ways of acting that we can 
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come to embody. Bateson (1979: 212) appropriately calls it “calibration” 
because, in contrast to local adjustments in this situation to this particular 
state of affairs, which we can call “feedback,” it emerges “from a class of 
past, completed action.” “By long practice, [practitioners] must adjust the 
setting of [their] nerves and muscles so that in the critical event, [they] will 
‘automatically’ give an optimum performance” (Bateson 1979: 211).12 
In the same vein, Lehrer (2009) discusses the switch in the mid-1980s 
from the ‘chalk and talk’ methods of training airplane pilots to the use of 
realistic flight simulators – with an associated reduction of crashes attributed 
to pilot error from a steady13 65% to around 17%. “The problem with [the 
classroom] approach,” Lehrer quotes a flight instructor as saying, “is that 
everything was abstract. The pilot has this body of knowledge, but they’d 
never applied it before” (Lehrer 2009: 241). The use of flight simulators, 
suggests Lehrer (2009: 242), “targets the dopamine system,14 which improves 
itself by studying errors. As a result, pilots develop accurate sets of flight 
instincts. Their brains are prepared in advance.” 
While Lehrer’s language use is different from my own, I think his point is 
clear: in the practical, dialogically-structured inquiries or explorations we 
make, spontaneously, within the situations that disorient or puzzle us, we do 
not need always to bring new theories, abstract thoughts, or new factual 
information to bear in trying to make sense of them. We can both bring to 
                                           
12  About “calibration,” Bateson (1979: 211) remarks that “‘calibration’ is related to 
‘feedback’ as higher logical type is related to lower.” In other words, what we come to 
embody is not simply an average, or a simply mixing of past experiences, but some-
thing like a sense of how – as in binocular vision – two or more variations on similar 
experiences are intra-related into a chiasmicly-structured whole, a sense that gives us 
a bodily experience of how to ‘ready’ ourselves for the occurrence of such expe-
riences.  
13  “Despite a long list of aviation reforms, from mandatory pilot layovers to increased 
classroom training,” says Lehrer (2009: 240), the percentage of crashes attributed to 
pilot error “refused to budge from 1940 to 1990, holding steady at around 65%.” 
14  Earlier in his book, Lehrer (2009: 42) writes: “What is interesting about [the dopa-
mine] system is that it’s all about expectation. Dopamine neurons constantly generate 
patterns based on experience: if this, then that.” It is not appropriate to pursue the 
possible contributions of that the use of neuro-scientific observations might make to 
innovations in people’s practices further here. But clearly, it is a sphere of research 
that is worth attending to.   
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bear experience that either we already possess, or that we can come to pos-
sess by ‘calibrating’ ourselves by living through the appropriate experiences.  
4. The gaining of a ‘poised resourcefulness’ with respect to human af-
fairs: What, then, can dialogically-structured inquiries, explorations, etc., 
offer those, who are already skilled practitioners in a particular profession, 
over and above what they already possess? 
They (can) work to ‘remind’ us – help us to become reflexively self-aware 
of the fact – that we continually function as one polarity in a ‘creative dy-
namic’ productive of (a usually unremarked upon) plenitude of possibilities 
available to us as to how to relate ourselves to our surroundings – possibili-
ties which, because of their plenitude, present us with difficulties of a rela-
tional or orientational kind as to which of all the possibilities available to us 
will in fact resolve the tension we feel in not ‘knowing our way about’, or 
how ‘to go on’, in our current circumstances (to state the matter in Wittgen-
stein’s 1953 terms). 
In short, such explorations can offer the gaining of a poised resourceful-
ness in one’s own special professional practice. Such a poised resourceful-
ness is something, I feel, that Tom Andersen came to embody in his profes-
sional practice. At greater length, such inquiries can offer us the possibility of 
our developing the capacity to enter each new and unique situation we en-
counter in our professional lives with a range of relevant responses to what-
ever contingencies – to do with human bewilderments, disorientations, 
puzzlements, feelings, emotions, and many other human disturbances we 
might meet there – ‘at the ready’, so to speak. Thus our living explorations 
and inquiries into our own ‘inner workings’, or own ‘inner movements’ of 
thoughtful feelings and feelingful thoughts we submit ourselves to, in our 
dialogically-structured inquiries, can thus be thought of a being the equiva-
lent in human affairs to the less extensive (but perhaps even more focused) 
‘self-disciplines’ skilled tennis players, say, submit themselves to (both ‘off-
court’ and ‘on-court’), that enable them to become poised on the brink of 
meeting whatever is ‘served up’ by an opponent with an appropriate or 
relevant response. 
So, although such inquiries cannot offer anything objective, anything that 
can easily be pointed at and described, nor can they offer us any techniques 
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for immediate practical application. They can in fact offer us something of 
much more value to those of us as professional practitioners who must act in 
the moment, from within the midst of complexity. All objective approaches 
tell us only of what we already know how to inquiry into; they lead us only 
towards the continual re-discovery of sameness, simply the elaboration of the 
cognitive knowledge we already possess – they cannot inform us of the 
distinctively different, invisible, possibilities for action available to us in each 
new and unique situation we occupy. 
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